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At dusk in Mexico, a bat flashes low over a coffee plantation, 
swiping a moth off a leaf and disappearing into the night.  In a large city 
park halfway around the world, a jay screeches shrilly as it snaps up an 
acorn and swoops away, burrowing it neatly for the winter.  In Texas, 
100 million bats pour out from caves and from under bridges, feeding in 
a frenzy over 10,000 acres of cotton plantations.  And in a Hawaiian 
forest, a thrush flutters down, nabs a red berry, and swoops to a perch, 
dropping the seed in alarm when the shadow of a hawk passes overhead.  
What do all of these actions have in common?  They all involve the 
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feeding habits of birds and bats, our winged cousins.  They also 
illustrate two frequently unrecognized ecosystem services: seed 
dispersal and pest control, services that are provided for free every day, 
all over the world.
1
 
 
The above description details, in an important sense, a discovery.  
By acknowledging the processes through which these winged creatures 
participate in an ecosystem, we have discovered how humans rely on the 
continuity of such processes.  This discovery invokes the notion of 
ecosystem services, which include the “wide range of conditions and 
processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that are 
part of them, help sustain and fulfill human life.”2  Mitigation of storm 
energy in wetlands, crop pollination, carbon sequestration, and wildlife 
rearing are examples of the processes occurring in functioning 
ecosystems that provide substantial benefits to humans and human well-
being. 
Informational mandates included in natural resource statutes should 
be effective vehicles for integrating the valuation of ecosystem services 
into resource management decisions.  The National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”),3 for instance, requires that the adverse impacts 
from a given action be assessed before an agency commits to an action, 
and the value of ecosystems to human welfare would seem relevant to 
that inquiry.  Yet the effort to integrate ecosystem services valuation into 
law has yielded complicated and unsatisfactory results.  The controversy 
in Clinch Coalition v. Damon,
4
 which involved an informational 
challenge to a proposed timber sale, illustrates a dismissive judicial 
disposition toward the valuation of ecosystem services as merely “a 
particular economic accounting methodology.”5  The Clinch Coalition 
decision is problematic for the district court’s understanding of the 
informational purposes of a variety of natural resources statutes and for 
the manner in which the court subjects ecosystem services assessment to 
agency discretion.
6
  The Clinch Coalition decision is important for 
 
 1.  Heather Tallis & Stephen Polasky, Assessing Multiple Ecosystem Services: An Integrated 
Tool for the Real World, in NATURAL CAPITAL: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MAPPING ECOSYSTEM 
SERVICES 34, 39 (Peter Kareiva et al. eds., 2011). 
 2.  Gretchen Daily et al., Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human Societies by 
Natural Ecosystems, 2 Issues in Ecology 1, 2 (1997) [hereinafter Daily et al., Benefits Supplied by 
Natural Ecosystems]. 
 3.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (1970). 
 4.  Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004). 
 5.  Id. at 380-381. 
 6.  Id.  
2
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highlighting the informational role that regulation should play in 
ensuring the continuing availability of benefits provided by ecological 
resources.
7
 
This article explores the Clinch Coalition decision to understand 
why the court would perpetuate a process that systematically rejects the 
relevance and value of ecosystem processes in the information gathering 
exercise entailed in these environmental regulations.
8
  The discussion 
begins with an introduction to ecosystem services as a study of human 
dependency on the services provided by functioning ecosystems.  In the 
second section, the article turns to the Clinch Coalition decision to 
outline the arguments relied upon by the court to legitimize the Forest 
Service’s decision to avoid an ecosystem services analysis.9  The article 
then presents the Clinch Coalition decision as an illustration of a 
fundamental misunderstanding of ecosystem services and their relevance 
and value in environmental regulation.
10
 
This article suggests that, by characterizing ecosystem services 
valuation as merely an alternative economic analysis or accounting 
method, the court highlighted an important informational goal for the 
next generation of environmental law: if environmental regulation is 
intended to facilitate a more efficient management of resources by 
correcting for resource market inefficiencies resulting from incomplete 
information, regulatory intervention should employ investigatory 
methodologies that result in the production of a more informed resource 
management decision.  This article first questions whether ecosystem 
services valuation is indeed an alternative methodology.  This section 
describes ecosystem services analysis as a means of economic and 
environmental valuation that is more inclusive than a commodity-based 
analysis: an analysis of ecosystem services is a more relevant and 
complete understanding of economics and environmental decision-
making, not alternative methodology.  Therefore, by rejecting the call 
for an ecosystem services analysis, the court allowed the agency to 
ignore relevant information about ecosystem impacts: ecosystem 
services analysis demands a more inclusive estimation of the opportunity 
cost of using and losing the ecosystems that produce timber, fish, and 
other goods and services, as well as the benefits of maintaining the flow 
of the goods and services that ecosystems produce. 
Second, this article concerns how to construct the notion of 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. 
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“information” to improve the information gathering exercise that is 
found in “action-forcing” statutes such as NEPA.11  Ecosystem services 
research supplies information on both economic values and ecosystem 
processes.  Excluding an accounting of “ecosystem services” can 
produce decisions that do not accurately or efficiently reflect the 
interdependency between ecological and economic wealth.  
Understanding natural resources in terms of the value of ecosystem 
services that they produce helps to contextualize the relationships 
between public needs, private wealth, and the cost of ecosystem loss.  
Such information falls squarely into the informational mandate of our 
resource management goals, but more importantly, such information is 
currently excluded from most environmental and economic valuations. 
I. NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION 
Historically, markets have excluded information on ecosystem 
processes and services, at least where those processes and services have 
not been commodified.  In the transition period between the 
environmental decade of the 1970s and the present, the field of vision 
has changed in irretrievable ways.
12
  This is demonstrated by the fact 
that the practice of allowing markets to determine the types of 
information that are considered valuable and relevant is being 
abandoned, as evidenced by the increasing frequency with which we can 
point to market failures as evidence that market mechanisms, by 
themselves, are unable to adequately identify and value all of the 
relevant and necessary information.  Environmental regulation has 
largely been designed to deal with environmental externalities, albeit in 
a variety of ways.  Some laws are intended to correct the social, 
ecological, or economic effects or market failure, such as hazardous 
waste laws or technology-based air and water regulations.  Other 
environmental laws seek to prevent market failures that result from 
decision making based on inadequate information or misinformation. 
This article focuses on the latter—informational type of 
environmental regulation.  Although the informational approach to 
environmental regulation appears straightforward, little has been written 
on the character of information that would simultaneously satisfy the 
letter of the law and respond to the economic efficiency purpose of the 
 
 11.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (1970). 
 12.  RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004) (detailing 
developments of environmental law); KARL BOYD BROOKS, BEFORE EARTH DAY: THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1945–1970 (2009) (Same).   
4
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regulatory effort.
13
  The salient question for the next generation of 
environmental law, from this perspective, relates both to the character of 
the information sought, and to the whether the process employed in the 
regulatory schemes insures the incorporation of standards for more 
economically relevant and environmentally valuable information. 
The ecological economics approach of ecosystem services provides 
some insights and direction for answering these questions.  Resource 
valuation that incorporates ecosystem services empowers resource 
managers to wield both ecology and economics to capture the value of 
ecosystem processes that law has long ignored.  This section presents the 
manner in which ecosystem services research offers a management 
framework that identifies and accounts for the services provided by 
natural resources that human societies rely upon.  This section also 
examines NEPA to illustrate the mechanics and purposes of 
informational regulation. 
A. Ecosystem Services 
Ecosystems “provide basic life support for human and animal 
populations and are the source of spiritual, aesthetic, and other human 
experiences that are valued in many ways by many people.”14  In some 
instances, ecosystems provide benefits by producing goods such as 
timber and fuels, seafood, fruits and nuts, as well as ingredients used in 
the production of pharmaceuticals and other industrial products.  
However, ecosystems are valuable in other ways that are more difficult 
to quantify.  The study of ecosystem services aims to develop 
information about and valuations of ecosystem goods and services that 
recognize the essential services that ecosystem processes provide.
15
 
Ecosystem services analyses typically identify the types of 
 
 13.  See, e.g., David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as 
Regulation, 31 ELR 10773 (July 2001); Bradley Karkkainen, Information as Environmental 
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm, 89 GEO.L.J. 257, 
260 n.7 (2001) (discussing evidence of positive correlations between disclosure requirements and 
emission reductions); Peter S. Menell, Structuring a Market-Oriented Federal Eco-Information 
Policy, 54 MD. L. REV. 1435 (1995) (“The principal policy effort addressing environmental 
degradation has been focused on the supply side of markets—laws and regulations directly 
controlling emissions of pollution and disposal of wastes.  Promoting green consumerism can 
complement the vast array of environmental laws and regulations by altering the demand for 
products.”). 
 14.  EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND 
SERVICES (EPA-SAB-09-012) 8 (May 2009), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/WebBOARD/ValProtEcolSys&Serv. 
 15.  See Daily et al., Benefits Supplied by Natural Ecosystems, supra note 2.  
5
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ecosystem services that have not been valued in the marketplace.
16
  
Although we may have a sense of the value of bananas and clean water, 
the ecological processes
17
 that produce bananas (goods) and filter water 
(services) have not been valued in the marketplace;
18
 these services 
“have no market value for the simple reason that no markets exist in 
which they can be exchanged.”19  Most of these services have not been 
recognized because their value “accrue[s] directly to humans without 
passing through the economy at all.  In many cases people are not even 
aware of them.”20  That is, “economic markets . . . only reveal demand 
for marketed goods and services.”21 
Of course, exclusion from the marketplace has not diminished the 
value of these services or, more specifically, has not altered the 
dependency of the human welfare on the continued receipt of ecosystem 
services.  The value of the world’s ecosystem services has been 
estimated to exceed the global GNP by 1.8 times, highlighting “that 
ecosystem services provide an important portion of the total contribution 
to human welfare on this planet.”22  As dynamic and complex systems of 
interaction between living organisms and non-living environment, 
ecosystems “provide basic life support for human and animal 
populations and are the source of spiritual, aesthetic, and other human 
experiences that are valued in many ways by many people.”23 
 
 16.  James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson & Gretchen Daily, Protecting Ecosystem Services: 
Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 311 (2001). 
 17.  The terms “ecosystem processes” and “ecosystem services” are both used, but not 
interchangeably: “Ecosystem processes are essential for the provision of ecosystem services but 
processes are not synonymous with services.  Until there is some person somewhere benefiting from 
an ecological process, it is only a process and not an ecosystem service.”  Tallis & Polasky, supra 
note 1. 
 18.  In addition to the scant attention given to ecosystem services by the market, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has recently acknowledged that its regulation of 
environmental quality has largely omitted the analysis involved in the ecosystem services approach.  
EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 14 (“Despite the importance of these ecological effects, EPA 
policy analyses have tended to focus on a limited set of ecological endpoints, such as those specified 
in tests for pesticide regulation (e.g., effects on the survival, growth, and reproduction of aquatic 
invertebrates, fish, birds, mammals, and terrestrial and aquatic plants) or specified in laws 
administered by the Agency (e.g., mortality to fish, birds, plants, and animals).”). 
 19.  Salzman, Thompson & Daily, supra note 16. 
 20.  Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital, 387 Nature 253, 257 (1997). 
 21.  Ida Kubiszewski et al., The Production and Allocation of Information as a Good that is 
Enhanced with Increased Use, 69 ECOL. ECON. 1344, 1347 (2010) (“However, many important 
goods and services are, in practice, ‘non-excludable’ and cannot be effectively privately owned.”). 
 22.  Costanza et al., supra note 20, at 259.  See also, Daily et al., Benefits Supplied by Natural 
Ecosystems, supra note 2; WALTER V. REID ET AL., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: 
SYNTHESIS v (2005).  
 23.  EPA SCI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 14. 
6
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By demanding a deeper, more functional understanding and 
valuation of the benefits derived from functioning ecosystems, the 
ecosystem services approach demands consideration of these previously 
ignored ecosystem functions.
24
  This more complete analysis of assets—
and by extension, more complete analysis of the cost of losing such 
services—results from the combination of ecology and economics found 
in ecosystem services: 
The science of ecology has largely been devoted to exploring the 
importance of ecosystem processes in natural contexts, but has ignored 
exploration of human service values until recently.  Similarly, 
economics as a discipline focuses on pricing in markets, but without 
information from ecologists about the delivery to humans of ecosystem 
services, the market necessarily will underrepresent those values in 
pricing and resource allocation decisions.  Researchers in both fields, 
however, have begun to bridge the gap, to fill in the very large hole of 
knowledge surrounding how ecologically important ecosystem 
attributes are economically valuable services to humans.
25
 
Unfortunately, the value of many ecosystem services is hidden 
because the extent of human reliance on and benefits from the ecosystem 
processes that sustain such services are invisible until those processes 
are lost or disrupted.
26
  Therefore, ecosystem services are critical pieces 
of an asset inventory on any scale.  Such an inventory can provide 
baseline economic and environmental information to contextualize 
evidence that alterations in a landscape will “change the benefits 
associated with human activities or change the costs of those 
activities.”27  An accounting of natural capital can also illustrate the 
 
 24.  John Porter et al., The Value of Producing Food, Energy, and Ecosystem Services within 
an Agro-Ecosystem, 38 AMBIO 186, 186 (2009). 
 25.  J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 24 (2007).  
 26.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON ASSESSING AND VALUING THE SERVICES OF 
AQUATIC AND RELATED TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARDS 
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 154 (2004) (“[T]he value of ecosystem services 
becomes apparent only after such services are diminished or lost, which occurs once the natural 
processes supporting the production of these services have been sufficiently degraded.”); Gretchen 
C. Daily, Introduction: What are Ecosystem Services?, in NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL 
DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 5 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (“[T]he nature and value 
of Earth’s life-support systems have been illuminated primarily through their disruption and loss.”). 
 27.  Such circumstances have value “insofar as they either change the benefits associated with 
human activities or change the costs or those activities.”  Costanza et al., supra note 20, at 255.  See 
also Gretchen C. Daily et al., Ecosystem Services in Decision Making: Time to Deliver, 7 FRONT 
ECOL. ENVIRON 21, 23 (2009) [hereinafter Daily et al., Decision Making] (“The main aim in 
understanding and valuing natural capital and ecosystem services is to make better decisions, 
resulting in better actions relating to the use of land, water, and other elements of natural capital.”). 
7
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consequences of policies that allocate rights to extract, use, or transfer 
natural resources by allowing for an analysis of discontinued ecological 
benefits. 
B. The Informational Mandates of NEPA 
Informational laws and regulations seek a variety of results, 
including the facilitation of a more informed and participatory public 
and more informed decision makers, both of which could operate to 
avoid poor natural resource decisions.  NEPA, as an example of an 
informational law,
28
 was initially adopted to insert a planning component 
into the normal progression of governmental decision-making.  Congress 
enacted NEPA “[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage 
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to 
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of 
man.”29  This general declaration of purpose does seem to suggest a 
substantive policy of sustainable decision-making and effective long-
term resource protection.  NEPA provides as follows: 
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man’s activity on 
the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, 
particularly the profound influences of population growth, high-density 
urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and 
expanding technological advances and recognizing further the critical 
importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the 
overall welfare and development of [humankind], declares that it is the 
continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to create and 
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in 
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other 
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
30
 
To implement this policy, Congress directed agencies “to the fullest 
extent possible” to interpret and administer laws with such ideas in 
mind, and also to engage the decision making process in a way that 
enhances consideration of the “unquantified environmental amenities 
and values” alongside of economic and technical considerations.  NEPA 
requires decision makers to be informed; NEPA requires that the 
probable environmental impacts from a given action be studied before an 
 
 28.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (1970). 
 29.  Id. at § 4321. 
 30.  Id.   
8
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agency commits to an action.
31
  Specifically, Congress required that the 
federal government: 
[I]nclude in every recommendation or report . . . a detailed statement 
by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the 
proposed action, (ii) any adverse  environmental effects which cannot 
be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the 
proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of 
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed 
action should it be implemented.
32
 
At least conceptually, an ecosystem services analysis fits well into each 
of these elements of the “detailed statement.”33  An analysis of disrupted 
ecosystem services certainly suggests impacts to the environment, 
including ones that cannot be avoided.  Such an analysis will provide a 
basis to compare alternatives to the proposed action, including the 
differences between a short-term capture of ecosystem goods and the 
long-term benefit of functioning ecosystems.  Similarly, an ecosystem 
services analysis will involve a valuation of those resources that are 
related to, and dependent on, the continuation of ecosystem processes for 
their productivity. 
Agency compliance with the full directives of NEPA has been slow 
and contentious.
34
  Nevertheless, much of the administrative process is 
now driven by NEPA procedures, including public review of 
environmental impacts and the preparation of an Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”).35  In this process, NEPA burdens federal actions 
heavily with information-gathering and transparent environmental 
review.
36
  NEPA “impose[s] on agencies an affirmative obligation to 
seek out information concerning the environmental consequences of 
 
 31.  Id.   
 32.  Id.   
 33.  Robert L. Fischman, The EPA’s NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVT. 
L.J. 497, 507 (2001) (Although valuation of ecosystem services could aid in the analysis of any of 
these five issues, it is the fourth issue, concerned with the long-term productivity of the 
environment, which has the strongest connection to the work of ecological economists.  It is the 
long-term productivity of soils, waters, and habitats that provide the services, such as pollution 
assimilation, that these researchers seek to quantify.). 
 34.  See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v, United States Atomic Energy 
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 35.  42 U.S.C. § 4321.   
 36.  Id.   
9
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proposed federal actions.”37  Agencies are required to include 
information in environmental review relating to reasonably foreseeable 
adverse impacts where the information “is essential to a reasoned choice 
among alternatives and the overall costs of obtaining it are not 
exorbitant.”38  Where information is difficult to obtain because “the 
overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means to obtain it are 
not known,” the agency is still required to identify and explain the 
significance of the missing information.  In addition, the scope of 
information demanded by NEPA seems sufficiently broad to cover a 
wide variety of impacts in terms of type and intensity and across time.
39
  
NEPA requires an analysis of direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts 
from a proposed action.
40
 
Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of the NEPA obligation 
is the assemblage of baseline ecological information.
41
  Robert Fischman 
contemplates a substantial investment in baseline information early in 
the NEPA process: 
The establishment of an environmental baseline combines both the 
CEQ requirements to obtain information and address cumulative 
impacts.  Once the study area is defined, the agency should collect 
baseline environmental data, determine gaps in the data, and design 
methods for collecting missing data.  It must ensure that the analysts 
have access to data that will allow them to assess “past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable” effects.  The analyst may need habitat 
inventories, water quality surveys, and studies of social and economic 
patterns in a community.  In some cases the collection of data may 
require sampling over four seasons or longer periods to ensure an 
understanding of the existing community social interactions, 
socioeconomic state, environmental conditions, or ecosystem 
processes.  Historical data can sometimes be used to supplement the 
baseline database.
42
 
Such information provides what may be the only basis for understanding 
and quantifying environmental impacts after the commencement of 
construction (and perhaps even post-completion), especially where a 
project diverges from its original plan (such as to adapt to changing 
market preferences) or where construction encounters unforeseen 
 
 37.  Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  
 38.  40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a) (2013).  
 39.  42 U.S.C. § 4321.   
 40.  40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 (2013). 
 41.  42 U.S.C. § 4321.   
 42.  Fischman, supra note 33, at 513-14.  
10
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impacts (such as the accumulation of changes from construction 
processes and natural disasters). 
II. THE EXAMPLE THAT CONFUSES THE RULE: CLINCH COALITION 
Mandates included in informational statutes, such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act and the “little NEPAs” in the states, should 
have proven (and may yet prove) to be effective vehicles for integrating 
ecosystem services concepts into watershed, ecosystem, and other 
natural resource system management.
43
  As Robert Fischman has argued, 
NEPA is “particularly well suited for the valuation of ecosystem 
services” due to the relationship between ecosystem services and the 
substantive goals of NEPA,
44
 because ecosystem valuation would 
provide important but often ignored information necessary to informed 
decision making.  And, further, because “valuation is in a state of 
development where a moderate increase in demand for information from 
the government would substantially advance the precision of valuation 
techniques.”45  Furthermore, NEPA46 is one of the very few regulatory 
tools that compels the aggregated consideration of environmental 
impacts on multiples levels and at multiple scales. 
Given the purposes of the informational mandate of NEPA,
47
 it may 
be difficult to grasp a judicial disposition that trivializes ecosystem 
function through a dismissive understanding of ecosystem services.  
Nevertheless, the courts have adopted ecosystem services in a fractured 
manner at best.  NEPA has been construed as an action forcing statute, 
but one that is largely devoid of substantive standards.
48
  Therefore, in 
Robertson v. Methow Valley,
49
 the Ninth Circuit noted that “it would not 
have violated NEPA if the Forest Service, after complying with the 
Act’s procedural prerequisites, had decided that the benefits to be 
 
 43.  42 U.S.C. § 4321.   
 44.  NEPA requires federal agencies to “use all practicable means and measures, including 
financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated . . . to create and maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,” and also to balance the needs of 
present and future generations, assure healthful and productive surroundings, “attain the widest 
range of beneficial uses of the environment,” and enhance environmental quality.  42 U.S.C. 
4331(a)-(b) (1970).  
 45.  Fischman, supra note 33, at 535. 
 46.  42 U.S.C. § 4321.   
 47.  Id.   
 48.  See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-228 (198) 
(per curiam); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).  
 49.  Robertson v. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. 332 (1989). 
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derived from downhill skiing at Sandy Butte justified the issuance of a 
special use permit, notwithstanding the loss of 15 percent, 50 percent, or 
even 100 percent of the mule deer herd.”50  The court concluded that 
although “[o]ther statutes may impose substantive environmental 
obligations on federal agencies . . . NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-
rather than unwise-agency action.”51  At issue in the Robertson 
controversy was not the loss of ecosystem services suffered from the 
loss of mule deer.
52
  Nevertheless, the courts have indicated a reluctance 
to open the NEPA
53
 process to ecosystem services. 
The controversy in Clinch Coalition v. Damon
54
 arose in the 
context of a proposed timber sale affecting public lands in the Bark 
Camp Area of the Jefferson National Forest.
55
  It is relevant that this 
case implicated the scope of an agency’s informational duties under 
NEPA.
56
  Although the District Court did not expressly disagree with 
Fishman’s vision for NEPA, it also rejected an understanding of NEPA 
that would require consideration of ecosystem services.
57
 
The Clinch Coalition controversy began with the observation that 
the Bark Camp Area was not in conformity with the Jefferson National 
Forest Management Plan.
58
  The Jefferson National Forest was created in 
1936 and, after it was combined with the George Washington National 
Forest in 1995, contained a geographical expense of 1.8 million acres of 
land spread over Virginia, Kentucky, and West Virginia.
59
  Initially, the 
Jefferson Forest was comprised on “lands nobody wanted” due to the 
resource extraction impacts and the transformative character of past uses 
of the land.
60
  The Bark Camp area has since been maintained as a 
popular recreational destination, as well as subject to the continuing 
 
 50.  Id. at 351.  
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 332. 
 53.  42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).   
 54.  Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004). 
 55.  Areas designated in the National Forest system are intended to “improve and protect the 
forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and 
to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States.”  
16 U.S.C.A. § 475 (1987).  Areas designated as National Forests are “administered for outdoor 
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.”  16 U.S.C.A. § 528 (1960).  
 56.  Clinch Coalition, 316 F. Supp. 2d. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 369. 
 59.  See Revised Land and Resource Management Plan: Jefferson Nat’l Forest, U.S. DEP’T 
OF AGRICULTURE 1-6 (2004), available at 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fsbdev3_000381.pdf. 
 60.  Id. at 2-2 (“[B]y the early 1990s, much of the higher elevation mountains and ridges in 
southwestern Virginia had been transformed into charred stumps and brushfields.”). 
12
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extraction of oil and gas.
61
  The Management Plan called for the careful 
management of a diverse array of habitats to support a diverse 
population of wildlife.
62
  Yet, due in large part to the character and 
content of past forest management practices in the Jefferson National 
Forest, the Forest Service predicted that the Bark Camp Area would 
soon be devoid of early successional habitat.
63
  To remedy this 
deficiency, the Forest Service formulated a vegetation management plan 
for the Bark Camp Area that was intended to bring the Area into 
conformance.
64
  The plan included a finding that the objectives of the 
action would be best served by including commercial harvest of timber 
of approximately 700 acres of the Area.
65
 
In furtherance of this plan, the Forest Service prepared an 
Environmental Assessment (“EA”) under NEPA.66  The EA examined 
the potential impacts of timber harvest on watershed functions due to 
sedimentation, considered the mitigation opportunities presented by the 
principles of the largely degree program, and discussed the economic 
impacts of the proposed timber sale.
67
  The EA concluded that the 
sedimentation impacts were negligible, and that any short-term adverse 
impacts of timber sale on recreational uses would be offset by a long-
term benefit from proper vegetation management.
68
 
The plaintiffs relied on a variety of legal sources—Multiple-Use 
Sustained-Yield Act (“MUSYA”),69 the Forest and Rangeland 
Renewable Resources Planning Act (“FRRRPA”),70 the National Forest 
Management Act (“NFMA”),71 NEPA,72 and Forest Service regulatory 
documents—to argue that the Forest Service was required to perform an 
ecosystem services analysis of the impacts of the proposed timber sale.  
The opponents to the sale called for an ecosystem services analysis and 
argued the area “may very well be acre for acre the greatest natural area 
 
 61.  Clinch Coalition, 316 F.Supp.2d at 369. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. at 370. 
 65.  Id.  Opposition groups take credit for compelling the Forest Service to reduce the size of 
the proposed Bark Camp timber sale, which was first announced in 1997 to encompass 1,413 acres.  
Hacking Away at High Knob, GREENPEACE, USA (Oct. 1, 2004), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/news-and-blogs/news/the-high-knob-area-of-the-jeff/.   
 66.  42 USC §4321 (1970). 
 67.  Clinch Coalition, 316 F.Supp.2d at 370. 
 68.  Id. at 371. 
 69.  16 U.S.C. §528 (1960). 
 70.  16 U.S.C. §1600 (1960). 
 71.  National Forest System Land and Resource Management Plans, 16 USC §1604 (1976). 
 72.  42 U.S.C §4321 (1970). 
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in all of Virginia and one of the greatest east of the Mississippi River.”73 
The court was unable to locate an ecosystem services demand in the 
multiple use directive of the MUSYA, which requires “the management 
of all the various renewable surface resources of the national forests so 
that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of 
the American people,”74 and found the statutory language “far from 
being a directive by Congress that the forest service must utilize a 
specific economic analysis, let alone the one Plaintiffs assert is 
required.”75  However, MUSYA also requires the Forest Service to give 
“due consideration” for the “relative values of the various resources in 
particular areas,”76 a directive that appears to require an analysis of the 
costs and benefits from a specific use.  The court insisted that “MUSYA 
contains no specific mandate that the Forest Service utilize a particular 
procedure to analyze the economic impacts of a proposed project and its 
alternatives.”77 
Likewise, the district court rejected the Plaintiffs’ reliance on 
language in FRRRPA requiring management of forestlands “to secure 
the maximum benefits of multiple sustained yield management,”78 
finding “no clear direction from Congress mandating that the Forest 
Service gather the information by any particular economic analysis 
method.”79  The court found no provision in NFMA “that mandates a 
particular methodology, particularly a methodology that quantifies the 
impact of timber harvesting on non-timber values,”80 a conclusion 
bolstered by legislative history that identified “only direct timber 
 
 73.  Unique Features of High Knob, THE CLINCH COALITION, 
http://clinchcoalition.net/index.php?pr=unique (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).  Objectors voiced a 
concern that the Bark Camp timber sale would cause irreversible damage to important ecosystem 
processes in the area:  
While only 1% of the logging will be “clearcut” as the Forest Service defines it, the log-
ging will remove most of the forest canopy in the 700-acre area.  Forest canopy is crucial 
to protect younger trees and wildlife and to shade the understory.  Several ecologically 
sensitive areas are included in the timber sale, such as winter hibernation habitat for the 
endangered Indiana bat.  The Clinch River, just six miles downstream from the timber 
sale area, is recognized worldwide for its tremendous aquatic diversity.  The watershed is 
home to 27 species that are federally listed as threatened or endangered-the highest con-
centration of federally protected species in the country.   
Hacking Away at High Knob, supra note 65. 
 74.  16 U.S.C. § 531 (1960). 
 75.  Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F.Supp.2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004). 
 76.  16 U.S.C. § 531 (1960). 
 77.  Clinch Coalition, 316 F. Supp.2d at 378. 
 78.  16 U.S.C. § 1601(d)(1) (1960). 
 79.  Clinch Coalition, 316 F. Supp.2d at 378-79. 
 80.  Id. at 379. 
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production costs and returns” for analysis.81  Although the court 
recognized that NEPA requires an economic analysis, it found that “the 
Forest Service complied with such mandate” in the EA, as NEPA “does 
not direct the Forest Service to use a particular economic accounting 
methodology, especially not the method asserted by plaintiffs that would 
require quantification of on non-timber values.”82  The district court left 
the matter of ecosystem services to the discretion of the Forest Service, 
largely unimpressed that an ecosystem services analysis would add to 
the process of taking a “hard look” at adverse environmental impacts.83 
III. CRITICAL OF CLINCH: ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AS BETTER 
INFORMATION 
An examination of the Clinch Coalition court’s reasoning suggests 
a misunderstanding of what the ecosystem services approach entails, 
demands, and adds to the set of information that is made available to 
decision makers and resource managers.
84
  Yet, the Clinch Coalition 
decision could prove to be benign.
85
  Legislative or regulatory 
developments could provide specific guidance on the appropriate 
employment of ecosystem services principles with the understanding 
that resources decision should not be made without all of the necessary 
information.  On the other hand, the court’s categorization of ecosystem 
services could instead provide a safe haven for shortsighted resource 
planning. 
This section addresses the Clinch Coalition decision by borrowing 
insights from economics.
86
  Specifically, this section looks to the role of 
information in avoiding market inefficiencies—an insight that has 
proven important in analyzing the recent failure of the financial 
institutions:
87
  
The current economic crisis has highlighted the need for government 
intervention in the event of the failure of a systemically important 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 380-81.  
 83.  Id. at 364.  
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  We are mindful of the notion that framing causes despair in cross-disciplinary ventures, 
particularly when the relevant insights are not correlative.  Another way of making this point: 
“knowing how ecosystem services operate ecologically will not guarantee sound economic and 
policy decisions about the environment, but not knowing how ecosystem services operate 
ecologically will guarantee unsound economic and policy decisions.  So economists have something 
to learn as well.”  J.B. RUHL ET AL., supra note 25, at 35. 
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institution.  But the need for massive intervention implies, in turn, the 
need to take actions to prevent the occurrence of such failures in the 
first place.  Sometimes the damage done by actions that have adverse 
effects on others can be compensated for after the fact, but in the cases 
at hand, this is in general not possible. Policy interventions should be 
designed to make less likely the occurrence of actions that generate 
significant negative spillovers, or externalities.
88
 
Economics explains the importance of informational regulatory 
interventions because it supports the value of avoiding market failures 
that result from incomplete information, and as such, explains the value 
of regulations that employ informational mechanisms to avoid market 
failure.
89
  Because economics directs the information-gathering process 
towards a larger set of relevant and important information, this 
framework will prove applicable to the informational needs in 
environmental regulation. 
A. The Economic Framework for Environmental Policy 
One of the most fundamental concepts of neoclassical economic 
theory is that markets that are competitive and free of government 
intervention
90
 are the most efficient means of allocating and managing 
the resources (including natural resources) which are necessary for the 
production of goods and services.  Adam Smith contended that free 
markets lead to efficient outcomes “as if by an invisible hand,”91 an 
assertion that has since been adapted by both economists and non-
economists to argue for the efficacy of free markets.  From this 
perspective, government regulation of private choices, public ownership 
of resources, and the provision of public goods and services interferes 
with the efficient allocation of resources.
92
 
 
 88.  Joseph E Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 11-23 
(David A. Moss & John A. Cisternino eds., 2009). 
 89.  Joseph E Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation 
(Paper Prepared for the Tobin Project’s conference on Government and Markets: Toward a New 
Theory of Regulation) (Yulee, Florida, Feb. 1-3, 2008) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Government Failure v. 
Market Failure]. 
 90.  Including regulation and/or the provision of public goods and services. 
 91.  Joseph E Stiglitz, Columbia Business School, Nobel Prize Lecture: Information and the 
Change in the Paradigm in Economics (Dec. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Stiglitz, Information and the 
Change in the Paradigm in Economics].  
 92.  Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare Economics, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS AND 
PROBABILITY 507-32 (Jerzy Neyman ed., 1951); GÉRARD DEBREU, THE THEORY OF VALUE (Yale 
Univ. Press 1959). 
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The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics provides a 
mathematically rigorous basis for the argument that competitive markets 
free from government intervention allocate and manage resources 
efficiently.  The form in which this theorem is stated today and the 
conditions under which it holds true is generally attributed to 1950s 
economists Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu.
93
  The theorem sets 
forth a set of conditions, including the well-defined ownership or 
property rights to the goods and services and the availability of perfect 
information, under which Adam Smith’s invisible hand works 
perfectly.
94
  Competitive markets in which these conditions strictly hold 
achieve Pareto efficiency (i.e. no one in society can be made better off 
without making someone else in society worse off).
95
  Given competitive 
markets for goods and services, perfect information, and well-defined 
property rights, society’s economic resources are allocated efficiently.96  
Government intervention in markets would be superfluous, or worse, 
disruptive. 
Most environmental problems that are framed in economic terms 
are posed as the failure of markets to correctly value environmental 
goods and services, a result of which is the creation of “externalities.”97  
In theory, if all of the costs and benefits inherent in the production and 
consumption of goods and services are known and borne by market 
participants in the form of market prices, no externalities would result 
from market transactions.
98
  Given that the economic theory behind 
perfectly functioning markets is based on a number of assumptions that 
are simply not realistic (especially in terms of environmental resources), 
some type of government intervention is required to internalize the 
externalities created through the production and consumption of goods 
and services.  Regulatory efforts to correct for environmental 
externalities have traditionally included the use of direct interventions 
such as proscriptions (things producers may not do), or mandates (things 
producers must do).  Often referred to as “command-and control” 
measures,
99
 these types of regulatory interventions have been found easy 
 
 93.  Arrow, supra note 92, at 507-32; DEBREU, supra note 92. 
 94.  Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, supra note 91. 
 95.  Issues of equity or distribution are not addressed in Pareto outcomes. 
 96.  Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, supra note 91.  
 97.  Loosely defined to reference the social, economic and environmental costs and benefits 
created in either the production or consumption of goods and services that are not borne by the 
decision makers in the market (i.e. cost and benefits not reflected in market prices). 
 98.  WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
7 (Cambridge Univ. 2d ed. 1988). 
 99.  Erwin H. Bulte et al., Payments for ecosystem services and poverty reduction: concepts, 
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to mandate but inefficient to implement.
100
 
More recently, environmental policy has focused on creating what 
are called market-based instruments (“MBIs”).101  As de Groot argues, 
“[o]ne major reason for the continued loss and degradation of 
ecosystems is that the value (importance) of ecosystems to human 
welfare is still underestimated in most economic development decisions 
because the benefits of their services are not, or only partly, captured in 
conventional market economics.”102  The majority of the goods and 
services that ecosystems produce are not valued in current markets.  The 
exceptions are often only valued as positive externalities resulting from 
the non-conversion of natural resources into products for the 
marketplace.  Given that markets for the productive capabilities of 
ecosystems are often incomplete or even “missing,” resource managers 
lack the sufficient incentives necessary to invest in maintenance or 
preservation of ecosystem services.  Neoclassical market theory 
maintains that in the absence of market price incentives which created 
through private ownership, natural resources will be unvalued or 
underpriced, creating incentives for society to use more of those 
resources than is socially efficient.
103
  In order to correct for 
undervaluation and overconsumption of natural resources, government 
intervention is required to create the missing incentives or markets.
104
  
Instead of attempting to force adherence to market regulations, 
environmental policy that creates MBIs attempts to use economic 
incentives to change the behavior of market participants.  There are two 
main forms of MBIs: (1) pollution taxes and subsidies and (2) tradable 
pollution permits.
105
 
Although there have been many successes in creating market-based 
instruments
106
 (such as emission trading schemes),
107
 their potential is 
 
issues, and empirical perspectives, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 13, 245-254 
(2008). 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Robert Starvins & Bradley Whitehead, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in 
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY (Marian Chertow & Daniel Esty eds., Yale Univ. Press 1997). 
 102.  Rudolf de Groot, Ecosystem Services, IUNC (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.iucn.org/about/union/commissions/cem/cem_work/cem_services/. 
 103.  BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 98 at 7. 
 104.  Forest Reinhardt, Market Failure and the Environmental Policies of Firms: Economic 
Rationales for “Beyond Compliance” Behavior, 3 J. INDUST. ECOLOGY, no. 1, 1999, at 9–21. 
 105.  ASAFU-ADJAYE, U.N. ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR ASIA & THE PAC., INTEGRATING 
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: THE CASE OF PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES: 
DEVELOPMENT PAPERS NO. 25 (2004).  
 106.  Robert Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 31-2 (Paul Portney & Robert Stavins eds., 2000). 
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considered limited.
108
  As Wegnera and Pascualb argue, “[i]ndividuals 
may perceive intangible benefits from nature, may not always have 
sufficient understanding of ecosystem services, and may not always 
decide independently from others on what value to attribute to 
ecosystem services.”109  Given that the theoretical conditions necessary 
for markets to produce an efficient allocation of resources never hold, 
there is no guarantee that using market based instruments to incentivize 
resource managers will generate more efficient management of natural 
resources or that they will prevent resource use from passing ecological 
tipping points.  At the end of the day, “the notion of economic value is 
of little use when an ecosystem approaches a critical ecological 
threshold and ecosystem services become non-substitutable and 
absolutely scarce.”110 
B. The Role of Information and Informational Regulation 
Information about the role and value of natural capital affects 
decision making about how resources are used in every context: on a 
personal level, within organizations and firms, in political processes.  
Although the failure of markets to capture and prevent environmental 
externalities and to create the incentives necessary for the efficient use 
of natural resources are both significant considerations, such issues 
derive from an availability of information about the total economic and 
ecological value of natural resources.
111
  Theoretically, a complete set of 
information about the quantity and quality of all of the goods and 
services that natural resources produce, and the role and the value of the 
natural resources themselves, would be available to all decision makers 
and resource managers.  Decision makers would also have complete 
information regarding all of the opportunity costs that would be created 
in the conversion of natural resources into goods and services for the 
market, and all of the benefits of maintaining the natural resources in 
 
 107.  Pavan Sukhdev, Putting a Price on Nature: The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity, 1 SOLUTIONS, no. 6, at 34-43, available at 
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/823. 
 108.  Frank Ackerman & Kevin Gallagher, Getting the Prices Wrong: The Limits of Market-
based Environmental Policy (Global Dev. & Envtl. Inst., Working Paper No. 00-05, 2000). 
 109.  Giulia Wegner & Unai Pascualb, Cost-benefit analysis in the context of ecosystem 
services for human well-being: a multidisciplinary critique (Ecosystem Servs. Econ., Working 
Paper No. 13, 2000), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.12.008. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  A key theoretical assumption of neoclassical economics is that “humans are omniscient 
actors; that is to say, we have complete information and perfect understanding of our set of choices, 
and hence we can always form preferences over goods and services.”  Id.  
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their current state for other current and future production possibilities.  
Given complete information and a competitive market for the goods and 
services which resources produce,
112
 collective decision making would 
lead to the most efficient allocation of resources. 
The problem faced when projecting the economic framework to 
problem solving is that information available to decision makers can 
never be complete or perfect.  Producers and consumers of goods and 
services inevitably lack sufficient information about the social, 
economic and environmental impacts of their production and 
consumption decisions.  In addition, we lack sufficient information 
about the role and value of the goods and services, which ecologies in 
and of themselves create.  Limited by the availability information, 
markets fail to reflect the full social and economic costs and benefits of 
the production or consumption of a good or service or of the conversion 
of natural resources into goods or services.  As a consequence, markets 
will not provide Pareto efficiency.
113
  Given imperfect or incomplete 
information, the market outcome will not be the most efficient or 
beneficial societal allocation of our natural resources.
114
 
Where incomplete information leads to the failure of the market to 
provide an efficient use of resources, the provision of a larger set of 
information should resolve the inefficiency.  By requiring the 
availability of a larger and more inclusive set of relevant (and 
symmetrical)
115
 information before resource decisions are made, the 
more we move towards efficient outcomes.  As such, and given the 
relationship between incomplete information and the failure of markets 
to provide the most efficient or beneficial allocation of resources, 
government interventions that mandate information-gathering and 
disclosure may be thought to increase societal and economic efficiency 
by making Pareto improvements to the circumstances.
116
  As Greenwald 
and Stiglitz have highlighted, “[m]arket forces do not necessarily lead to 
full (or efficient) disclosure of information,” leading to the conclusion 
that “there is a good rationale for disclosure requirements.  Markets 
cannot function well with distorted and imperfect information; hence, 
requirements that lead to improved information can (by and large) lead 
 
 112.  Ceterus parabus, assuming all other first theorem conditions hold. 
 113.  Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect 
Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 QUARTERLY J. ECON., no. 2, 1986, at, 229-264. 
 114.  Market Failure and Ecological Goods and Services. 
 115.  Vs. asymmetrical information, where one party in a transaction has more or superior 
information compared to another. 
 116.  Greenwald & Stiglitz, supra note 113.  
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to better resource allocations.”117 
C. Not Just Another “Economic Methodology” 
Given the foregoing introduction to information and its role in 
making Pareto improvements, it is worth noting that the Clinch 
Coalition court did not opine that an ecosystem services analysis would 
yield less or inadequate information.
118
  The court did not rule that an 
ecosystem services analysis would violate informational duties relevant 
to the timber sale.
119
  Rather, the court ruled that ecosystem services 
represented an alternative method of information gathering and 
assessment; presumably, that it would yield the same information but 
package it differently.
120
  Such a ruling misunderstands the relationship 
between ecosystem services and the economic concept of efficient 
resource management. 
Given the history of drive toward investigating ecosystems and 
nonmarket worth, it is not surprising to see some resistance against 
ecosystem services principles.  J.B. Ruhl and his colleagues note that 
“estimates of nonmarket ecosystem service value is perhaps the most 
vexing in the long run in terms of policy development [because] . . . non 
market value estimates are essentially models of economic value rather 
than the direct measure that market prices provide.”121  However, by 
characterizing ecosystem services as merely another economic theory or 
accounting method, the court seems to have missed the profound 
contribution that information about ecosystem services makes to 
efficient and sustainable environmental decision making in both the 
short- and long-run, and to well-functioning markets for natural 
resources.
122
  The court has also somewhat diminished the spirit of 
NEPA by discounting the critical value of information in decision-
making and in the efficient management of natural resources.
123
 
The study of ecosystem services punctuates the idea that natural 
capital is exhaustible and demonstrates the falsity of the notion that 
human productivity “operates at too small a scale relative to natural 
processes to interfere with the free provision of natural goods and 
 
 117.  Stiglitz, Government Failure v. Market Failure, supra note 89. 
 118.  Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004). 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Ruhl et al., supra note 25. 
 122.  Clinch, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 364.  
 123.  Id.  
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services.”124  Such “free” services must be accounted for to accurately 
reflect the costs of losing such services.  An analysis of relevant 
ecosystem services helps to identify the types of information not 
recognized or accounted for in other valuation approaches.  It is 
important to note, for instance, that the market has borne little 
information on the value of photosynthesis: “[o]ne does not have to 
purchase photosynthesis or the radiation screening effects of the ozone 
layer, and therefore no data on market price are available for them.”125  
In contrast, ecosystem services valuation centralizes the notion that 
ecosystems “provide basic life support for human and animal 
populations and are the source of spiritual, aesthetic, and other human 
experiences that are valued in many ways by many people.”126  As such, 
“[a]ssessing ecosystem services implies focusing on how the 
environment contributes to people’s well-being.”127  Included in this 
analysis are access to extractable and marketable resources, nutrition and 
water, security, and sense of place and identity.  The ecosystem services 
analysis requires an identification of the benefits and beneficiaries of 
relevant baseline ecosystem processes so that a proper and accurate 
accounting can be made after a proposed ecological transformation. 
The ecosystem services analysis also provides an estimate of the 
costs of using and losing the ecosystems and ecosystem processes that 
produce goods and services, and as such, falls squarely into the demands 
of our resource management goals.
128
  WRI notes that substantial 
benefits from employing ecosystem services analysis may particularly 
obtain on projects that: 
 May lead to ecosystem change in contexts where people 
and communities have a high level of dependency on 
ecosystems to maintain their livelihoods and cultural 
identity and are therefore of vulnerable to ecosystem 
change.  This includes remote areas that are opening to 
development. 
 Depend on ecosystem services and are therefore vulnerable 
 
 124.  Robert Costanza & Herman E. Daly, Natural Capital and Sustainable Development, 6 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 37, 39 (1992).   
 125.  Ruhl et al., supra note 25. 
 126.  U.S. EPA, SCI. ADVISORY BD., VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 
AND SERVICES 8 (2009). 
 127.  Florence Landsberg et al., Ecosystem Services Review for Impact Assessment: 
Introduction and Guide to Scoping 4 (WRI, Working Paper, Nov. 2011), available at 
http://ecosystemcommons.org/sites/default/files/wri_esr_for_ia_wp1.pdf. 
 128.  See Keith H. Hirokawa, Disaster and Ecosystem Services: From the Cuyahoga to the 
Deepwater Horizon, 74 ALB. L. REV. 543 (2010/2011). 
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to ecosystem change.  This includes projects that, for 
example, share water resources with other stakeholders, or 
require erosion control for viability. 
 Are controversial and require the developer to be proactive 
in their relations with affected people to avoid legal battles 
or delays in project implementation or operation.  This 
includes areas where citizens are actively involved and 
likely to demand project oversight.
129
 
In these circumstances, in which the needs and dependencies of 
ecosystem beneficiaries are brought to the fore, the ecosystem services 
analysis helps to establish values and terms that can capture the 
relevance of ecosystem changes to local, regional, and national 
audiences.  Such insights were lost in the court’s reliance on legislative 
history to reject the plaintiffs’ NFMA argument: “Costs and benefits 
attributable to other resource values should be excluded because of the 
lack of certainty involved in assigning values to other benefits derived 
and the impact on multiple use goals.”130  In the two decades that have 
passed between the legislative statement and the development of the 
economic analysis in ecosystem services, ecosystem services analysis 
has proven purposeful precisely in filling the information gap and 
providing greater “certainty . . . in assigning values to other benefits 
derived.”131  Ecosystem services accounting is premised on economic 
principles and provides a fuller view of costs and benefits.  Ecosystem 
services insights are not alternative to market values. 
D. Ecosystem Services Analysis Provides Better Information 
A recognition and valuation of ecosystem services is essential to 
governmental decision-making, community identity, and economic 
opportunity.  The benefits produced by ecosystem services compel an 
understanding of ecosystems that recognizes not only the commodity 
values of goods produced by ecosystems, but also the value of the 
essential services that ecosystems provide.  Indeed, our relationship with 
nature is one of dependency: 
Natural systems provide foundational economic goods and services 
including oxygen, water, land, food, climate stability, storm and flood 
 
 129.  Landsberg et al., supra note 127. 
 130.  Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F.Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004) (citing S. REP. NO. 94-
893 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6662, 6667 (1976)) (italics added).  
 131.  Daily et al., Benefits Supplied by Natural Ecosystems, supra note 2, at 2; Costanza et al., 
supra note 20. 
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protection, recreation, aesthetic value, raw materials, minerals, and 
energy.  All “built capital” is made of natural capital, including cars, 
buildings and food.  An economy also requires hurricane protection, a 
stable climate, waste assimilation and other natural services.  No 
economy can function without nature’s provision of economic goods 
and services.
132
 
Economies do not operate independently of natural capital, and as such, 
do not operate independently of ecosystems and ecosystem processes. 
Based on these insights, it might seem intuitively compelling to 
seek more information on the processes by which ecosystems serve 
human needs.  Yet, conventional markets, as endorsed by law, generally 
lack the requisite mechanisms to incentivize information gathering of the 
types of information that are essential to the valuation of public goods, 
including information relating to the protection of ecosystem services.  
Conventional markets discourage such information or otherwise change 
the question: “the root of the problem for ecosystem services has been 
the law’s utilitarian premise that developing natural resources invariably 
puts land to higher and better uses and maximizes social welfare where 
both are measured in monetary terms.”133 
This comparison—the values represented by ecosystem services 
and conventional valuation—does call into question the difficult task of 
identifying which and how much information is relevant to the problem-
solving function of informational regulations.  Here, understanding 
natural resource management through the economic framework provides 
tools that illustrate the relevant role of ecosystem services to the 
regulatory process.  Regulation that mandates consideration of a more 
complete set of information concerning the environmental and economic 
impacts of resource use ensures more efficient management of resources 
by correcting for resource market inefficiencies resulting from 
incomplete information.  Ecosystem services analysis generates a more 
complete set of information to decision makers than traditional 
economic/environmental analyses (such as cost-benefit analyses).  An 
engaged investigation into relevant ecosystem services will discover the 
ecosystem processes that sustain those services of value to local 
communities and those other beneficiaries of such services. 
 
 132.  DAVID BATKER ET AL., GAINING GROUND: WETLANDS, HURRICANES AND THE 
ECONOMY: THE VALUE OF RESTORING THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER DELTA 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.eartheconomics.org/FileLibrary/file/Reports/Louisiana/Earth_Economics_Report_on_th
e_Mississippi_River_Delta_compressed.pdf. 
 133.  Christopher L. Lant, The Tragedy of Ecosystem Services, 58 BIOSCIENCE 969, 972 (Nov. 
2008). 
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In neoclassical economic theory, the value of natural resources is 
limited to that of an input in the production function.  The more natural 
capital is extracted and converted through the production process, the 
greater our capacity to produce the goods and services that increase 
society’s wellbeing.  In traditional market-based valuations of natural 
resources, only the benefit of converting resources through the 
production process is compared to the cost of converting those resources 
(including present and future costs and benefits inherent in the 
conversion of the resources into goods and services).  The ecosystem 
services perspective not only recognizes that natural resources are 
producers of goods and services, but also that the goods and services 
produced by ecosystems might represent a greater economic, social, and 
environmental value than the goods and services acquired from the 
conversion of those natural resources over time. 
The market reluctance to acknowledge ecosystem services is further 
illuminated by the types of services that ecosystems provide.  Although 
the ecosystem services analysis provides a valuation of the services 
provided, the basis for that valuation is founded in the continuation of 
functions and processes in ecosystems.  The range of services provided 
by ecosystems may be understood to include the following: 
“provisioning services such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating 
services that affect climate, floods, disease, wastes, and water quality; 
cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual 
benefits; and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, 
and nutrient cycling.”134  These ecosystem services illustrate our 
economic dependence on ecosystems, not as resources to be converted, 
but as the producer of goods and services critical to human needs, and 
economic and ecological wealth.  As discussed above, ecosystem 
services employs market theory to assesses costs and benefits in terms 
that represent market function.  However, the economics of ecosystem 
services is ecological; it drives the way we understand the value of 
ecosystems and ecosystem functions, and as such, it largely determines 
the character of the ecological information that is gathered and the logic 
that such information invokes, such as whether the information indicates 
a significant adverse impact or a negligible (ecological) cost. 
Applying the informational lessons of ecosystem services valuation 
to the Clinch Coalition
135
 decision illustrates the informational 
 
 134.  WALTER V. REID ET. AL., MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND 
HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS v (2005), available at 
http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf. 
 135.  Clinch Coalition v. Damon, 316 F. Supp. 2d 364 (W.D.Va. 2004). 
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advantages of ecosystem services assessment.  The Clinch Coalition 
decision provides the following description of the Forest Service’s 
investigation: 
The EA also discussed the economic impacts of the Project, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  The EA included a discussion of the 
costs and revenues of the project planning and timber harvest activities 
associated with each alternative proposed by the Forest Service.  The 
EA also concluded that the Project would at first negatively impact 
recreational use; however, the Project eventually would benefit 
recreational uses through, among other things, improvement of the 
view from the High Knob Tower and improvement of access for 
dispersed recreational pursuits.  The EA also discussed several other 
economic impacts as well.
136
 
In contrast, the plaintiffs asked for a broader and deeper analysis of the 
certain impacts from the proposed time harvest: 
The Plaintiffs next assert that “[i]n authorizing the Bark Camp timber 
sale, the Forest Service failed to account for the significant economic 
value associated with clean water, wildlife, recreation, scenery, non-
timber forest products, and other non-priced ‘ecosystem services’ 
generated by the Bark Camp timber sale area in its existing condition.”  
In addition, the Plaintiffs assert that the Forest Service failed to 
account for the reduction in these economic values, which will result 
from logging and road building.  Therefore, the Plaintiffs argue that the 
economic analysis provided by the Forest Service in the EA used to 
justify the Bark Camp timber sale was inadequate under NFMA and 
NEPA.
137
 
The plaintiffs’ request was not based on speculation: logging and road 
building unquestionably impact “clean water, wildlife, recreation, 
scenery, non-timber forest products, and other non-priced ‘ecosystem 
services,’” and these services are associated with significant and readily 
available economic values.
138
  The plaintiffs merely attempted to 
illustrate the ways in which “our largely un-marketed ecological wealth 
underpins our marketed economic wealth,”139 not by proposing a novel 
or alternative methodology, but by proposing that the information be 
gathered and calculated in a way that is relevant to impacts on the 
economy and on human welfare.   
 
 136.  Id. at 371. 
 137.  Id. at 377. 
 138.  Id.   
 139.  John Porter et al., The Value of Producing Food, Energy, and Ecosystem Services within 
an Agro-Ecosystem, 38 AMBIO 186 (2009). 
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Ecosystem services is intended to further inform the regulatory 
process by giving a fuller value of resources by reference to ecosystem 
processes and the role that any particular ecosystem component might 
serve to the functionality of the system.  That is, ecosystem services 
information is better information: ecosystem services information 
provides better baseline information for understanding changes to 
ecosystems by facilitating the valuation of those changes.  The 
ecosystem services approach does not merely assess the value of goods 
and services produced by converting natural resources to commodities, it 
also demands an accounting of the goods and services that are produced 
by the natural resources themselves and the value of production over 
time.  As such, “[i]t is far better economics to avoid wrecking productive 
natural systems, or to restore them when damaged, than attempt to 
displace or do without them.”140 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One of the most interesting features of the ecosystem services 
perspective is its youth.  The study of the value of ecosystem services is 
a recent trend.
141
  This does not mean that human settlements have been 
unable to identify natural systems, or that humans have failed to grasp 
the relevance of ecosystem processes, but that our current social and 
economic systems have failed to value ecosystems holistically for their 
function, location, and interactions.  What we are finding, in looking 
more closely at the manner in which ecosystem processes benefit human 
welfare, is that ecosystems are critical to human survival: “without 
ecosystem services, we all die.”142 
Policymakers and resource managers are regularly called upon to 
prioritize the trade-offs concerning land conversion and environmental 
management.  These decisions, even when benefitted by environmental 
impact statements, are too often made without fully accounting for the 
loss of goods and services produced by natural ecosystems.
143
  Mindful 
of the notion that “[a]s a resource, information has unique characteristics 
 
 140.  BATKER ET AL., supra note 132. 
 141.  Harold Mooney & Paul Ehrlich, Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary History, in 
NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 11 (Gretchen C. Daily 
ed., 1997); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157, 158-61 (2007) (identifying 1997-98 as the emergence of ecosystem 
services analysis). 
 142.  Ruhl et al., supra note 25. 
 143.  Pavan Sukhdev, Putting a Price on Nature: The Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity, 1 SOLUTIONS, no. 6, at 34-43, available at 
http://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/node/823. 
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that affect its allocation,”144 this article builds on the potential of 
informational regulations to compel effective information gathering.  
Regulations play a key role in addressing market failures due to 
incomplete information
145
 by forcing parties to gather and disclose a 
larger set of information.  Regulations that require the disclosure of 
information, which would not necessarily be disclosed through market 
forces alone, are useful in seeking the more efficient management of 
resources. 
The WRI has proposed that ecosystem services analysis, when 
addressed in a systemic manner, can provide significant assistance: 
 At the scoping stage: systematically and comprehensively 
identify the ecosystem services to be addressed in further 
stages of [environmental impact review]; 
 At the impact stage: assess (1) the negative project impact 
on ecosystem services in terms of changes in the well-being 
of their beneficiaries and (2) the project dependence on 
ecosystem services in terms of changes in project 
performance; and 
 At the mitigation stage: identify options through the 
mitigation hierarchy to enhance or at least maintain (1) the 
well-being affected beneficiaries derive from ecosystem 
services and (2) the performance the project derives from 
ecosystem services at acceptable levels.
146
 
When employed as such, an ecosystem services analysis allows 
stakeholders to better understand the projected project impacts in useful 
terms and in light of tradeoffs, to incorporate the value of co-benefits 
from the project or mitigation measures, and to ensure that the decision 
is founded on inclusive investigations and valuations.  As Fischman 
argues, “ecosystem services can broaden the scope of cumulative 
analysis by defining the reasonably foreseeable horizon, and can 
contribute to making predictions about the type and extent of the 
impacts.”147  In this light, the informational application of ecosystem 
services analysis can be seen to improve the informational regulation: 
“The main aim in understanding and valuing natural capital and 
ecosystem services is to make better decisions, resulting in better actions 
relating to the use of land, water, and other elements of natural 
 
 144.  Ida Kubiszewski et al., The Production and Allocation of Information as a Good that is 
Enhanced with Increased Use, 69 ECOL. ECON. 1344, 1346 (2010).  
 145.  Stiglitz, Government Failure v. Market Failure, supra note 89. 
 146.  Landsberg, supra note 127, at 3.   
 147.  Fischman, supra note 33. 
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capital.”148 
 
 
 148.  Daily et al., Decision Making, supra note 27, at 23.   
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